U.S. state governments are active financiers of new science and technology companies. Yet little is known about the effects of state R&D funding on the performance of recipient ventures. This study provides new evidence based on competitive R&D awards administered by the state of Michigan from 2002 through 2008. We find strong and compelling evidence that state R&D awards enhanced the commercial viability (i.e., survival) of recipient firms, suggesting a relaxation of financial constraints. Among firms with scores near the discontinuous funding threshold, our estimates suggest that awardees were 15% to 25% more likely to survive three years after the competition than otherwise comparable applicants that sought but failed to receive an award. We also find that receipt of state R&D funding enhanced the follow-on financing for these new ventures, but only for those with more onerous information challenges in entrepreneurial capital markets.
Introduction
Faced with an eroding base of traditional manufacturing industries, U.S. state governments have assumed a more prominent role as financiers of new science and technology companies. In 2002, for example, Ohio launched a $1.6 billion Ohio Third Frontier (OTF) initiative to support technology-based economic development within the state. The program is credited with helping create and finance over 500 Ohio-based companies since its inception (SRI 2009) . Also aimed at stimulating entrepreneurial innovation inside its borders, the state of Utah established a Science it is difficult to discern whether state funds causally improve firm performance or whether more promising companies are simply chosen for awards. Given the pervasiveness of state-level R&D programs (Coburn and Berglund 1995, Feldman and Lanahan 2010) , distinguishing between these interpretations is vital both from an academic and practical (managerial/public policy) perspective.
This study provides new evidence based on innovation programs launched since 1999 in the state of Michigan. Like many states in the Great Lakes Region, Michigan has been battered for decades by declining health in its manufacturing sectors and an outmigration of high-skilled labor (Samuel 2010) . To diversify its tax base and re-kindle economic growth within the state, the Michigan Life Science Corridor (MLSC) program was launched in 1999 through a $1 billion legal settlement from the tobacco industry. Similar to the later Ohio and Utah initiatives, the MLSC and its affiliated programs offer R&D financing to startups through a competitive awards process.
To test whether state R&D awards enhance the performance of participating ventures, we compile a novel database from Michigan government archives on all for-profit participants in competitions held from 2002 through 2008. Importantly, these data enable us to observe both pretreatment characteristics and external reviewer scores for the entire applicant pool, including firms that sought but failed to receive an award. Also useful from a methodological perspective, these data reveal discontinuous cut-offs in the distribution of reviewer scores that correspond to receipt of funding. This artifact of the selections process enables us to use regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods to compile more comparable sets of participating and non-participating ventures than is typically possible for innovation scholars. Increasingly common in economics (e.g., Black 1999, Lee and Lemieux 2010) , RDD-related approaches remain under-utilized in the strategic management and entrepreneurial finance literatures. 1 The results of our analyses are quite striking. On one hand, we find strong and compelling evidence that program participation bolstered the commercial viability of Michigan-based technology companies: funded firms are 15% to 25% more likely to survive 2-3 years after the competition. The results hold in subsamples of firms proximate to the funding cut-off and do not appear to be driven purely by the selection of "better" companies for the awards. This evidence is consistent with the view that the program helped ameliorate imperfections in the market for entrepreneurial financing: absent R&D awards from the state, companies of comparable quality were less likely to remain in business.
The effects of program participation on other aspects of entrepreneurial-firm performance-including patent productivity and receipt of follow-on financing-are more 1 See Kerr et al. (2011) for a recent exception in entrepreneurial finance.
ambiguous. Surprisingly, we find no discernable effect of award receipt on patent productivity. Our analysis reveals, however, that state R&D funding stimulates follow-on financing from other government (SBIR) and VC sources when capital-market imperfections are more severe. We interpret this latter evidence as consistent with the view that competition-based R&D awards help reduce informational inefficiencies in markets for entrepreneurial financing (Lerner 1999; Hall and Lerner 2010 ).
This study contributes to three main strands of literature. First, it contributes to a burgeoning literature in strategic management and economics on the performance implications of alternative sources of entrepreneurial financing. Prior work has investigated the effects on new ventures of financial backing from corporations (Katila et al. 2008 , Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009 , Park et al. 2012 , independent venture capitalists (Hellmann and Puri 2002 , Hsu 2004 , Fitza et al 2009 and national government agencies (Kortum and Lerner 2000 , Brander et al. 2010 , Cox and Katila 2010 . The extent to which, if at all, R&D financing from state-government sources affects new venture performance has received little attention in this literature, a gap that our study helps fill.
Within strategic management, the study also is salient to an ongoing search for ways to tease apart the consequences associated with non-random actions using observational data, a methodological challenge that continues to garner widespread attention in the field (Shaver 1998 , Hamilton and Nickerson 2003 , Durand and Vaara 2009 ). Our study not only underscores the importance of taking into account the underlying selection process, but also illustrates how discontinuities that result from that process can be fruitfully exploited.
Finally, we contribute to a more targeted line of inquiry on R&D program evaluation (Klette et al. 2000 , Jaffe 2002 ). Even though governments aim to alleviate sources of market failure through R&D policy intervention, they often fail to do so due to design and implementation problems (Wallsten 2000 , Lerner 2009 ). Empirical evidence on this topic nonetheless remains inconclusive and is sparse in state-government contexts. We provide new evidence with an approach that could be used to evaluate the private returns of other R&D programs, both within the United States and in other countries. Although providing limited guidance on whether public R&D programs are justified from a social welfare perspective (see Klette et al. 2000) , such evidence would deepen extant understanding on the extent to which government R&D awards boost the performance of award recipients above and beyond what otherwise would be predicted.
Rationale for Government R&D Awards and Prior Empirical Evidence
Why should governments subsidize R&D projects in the private sector?
2 The answer rests on theoretical concerns about market failure. One concern is that, absent policy intervention, the private sector will under-invest in R&D relative to socially optimum levels (Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996; Jaffe, 2002) . The output of R&D ("knowledge") has a public goods component: use by one firm does not preclude use by another. In the presence of knowledge externalities, or "spillovers,"
the socially optimal rate of R&D investment can exceed the private returns to such investments.
A second and related concern is that capital markets function imperfectly, further eroding R&D incentives in the private sector (Hall and Lerner, 2010) . For young science and technology companies, the development and commercialization of new products typically requires financial backing from third parties. Discerning the value and commercial promise of embryonic technologies nonetheless can be difficult for outsiders. As Hall and Lerner (2010) point out, when investors find it challenging to sort good projects from bad due to imperfect information, financial backing can be more costly or difficult to secure. If financial intermediaries like banks, angel investors, and venture capitalists are unable to fully mitigate this problem, entrepreneurs may be unable to secure sufficient capital through market mechanisms alone (Lerner & Kegler 2000) .
In addition, state governments pursue more parochial interests: to stimulate economic growth inside geographic borders and to diversify the tax base (Acs et al. 2008) . Not surprisingly, eligibility in state-run R&D and commercialization programs is therefore restricted to companies with headquarters or major R&D facilities within the state. A more specific concern is that entrepreneurs within the state may find it difficult to secure "expansion" capital without re-locating to a major hub of venture capital activity. Despite syndicated deals through investor networks, the initiative have received the lion's share of analytical attention. 4 Even then, prior studies fail to reach consensus on the effects of these long-standing programs on participant-firm performance.
Consider evidence from the SBIR program. Comparing SBIR awardees with matched samples of entrepreneurial companies, Lerner (1999) finds that SBIR recipients are more successful in securing follow-on VC financing relative to non-recipients. This evidence is consistent with the view that winning a public R&D awards can help "certify" the quality of new technology companies to outside investors, thus reducing information problems in markets for entrepreneurial financing. (Feldman and Kelley (2003) report a similar "halo" effect in the ATP program.) Based on survey evidence, Audretsch et al. (2002) further suggest that SBIR awards enable the commercialization of research that would not have been undertaken absent policy intervention.
Wallsten (2000) and Cox and Katilla (2010) offer a less sanguine view of the relationship between SBIR funding and new venture performance. Taking into account the SBIR selection process, Wallsten (2000) fails to discern that the awards stimulate employment growth among young companies, an effect attributed to the "cherry-picking" of more-promising applicants for the awards.
More troublesome, Wallsten suggests that the SBIR program fails to address capital-market imperfections, crowding out R&D funds from private sources on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Also troublesome, Cox and Katila (2010) Under this umbrella of programs, Michigan-based companies could apply for R&D awards to help defray product development and commercialization expenses in eligible sectors, with preference given to young and small companies. Relative to other sources of government R&D funds for technology ventures, the sums available from the state are non-trivial. As shown in Figure   1 , the mean award per firm was $600,000 in 2002 and exceeded $1.5 million in the 2006 and 2008 competitions. By comparison, SBIR technology development and commercialization awards in this period averaged around $500,000 but included a per-firm limit of $1 million is premature to assess the impact of these fund-of-fund investments, either overall or relative to direct models of R&D financing. We therefore restrict attention below to R&D awards directly allocated to technology startups through the combined set of MLSC, MTTC and 21CJF programs.
The Selection Process
To receive R&D funding from the state, entrepreneurs must submit an application through a competitive awards process. As depicted in Figure 2 , proposals are first screened for Request for Proposal (RFP) compliance. All proposals that meet the RFP requirements proceed through a competitive evaluation and review process. In Round 1, proposals are sent to an external panel of peer reviewers for evaluation and scoring. 9 The proposals are scored based on four equal-weighted criteria specified in the RFP: (1) Scientific Merit, (2) Personnel expertise, (3) Commercialization
Merit and (4) Ability to Leverage Additional Funds. Based on Round 1 scores, top-ranked proposals are invited to proceed to Round 2. Lower-ranked proposals are omitted from consideration.
In Round 2, additional input is gleaned from interviews with representatives from applicant companies and proposals are re-scored based on the RFP criteria. Following this second evaluation, the external review panel recommends proposals for funding and provides the state information about each proposal's ranking, score, and budget. A governing board, the Strategic Economic Investment and Commercialization (SEIC) Board, then selects the highest-ranked projects recommended for funding until the total budget allocated for the competition is expended.
According to MEDC officials, the total budget amount for a competition round is largely predetermined prior to a solicitation for proposals. Funding decisions are final and not subject to appeal.
The final stage is "due diligence" and contract negotiation. At this stage, projects can be dropped for two main reasons. First, the state may choose to rescind an award if new information revealed through due diligence renders an applicant ineligible (e.g., financial commitments from third parties have fallen through). Alternatively, the applicant may choose to withdraw from consideration due to concerns about the terms or cost of financing or unrelated reasons (e.g., a shift in corporate priorities).
Of the 273 entrepreneurial-firm proposals in our estimation sample described below, roughly half (49%) were screened out in Round 1 of the selection process while the remainder (51%) proceeded to Round 2. Of those invited to Round 2, less than half (46%) received R&D funds. In total, 23% of all entrepreneurial-firm applicants from 2002 through 2008 received financial assistance through these state-run R&D programs. 
Sample Construction
Applicants for R&D financing through Michigan's competition-based programs were identified with archival data from the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. For each proposal, these data report information about the principle investigator (name, title, department), organization (name, address), project type (applied research or commercialization), industry sector, and funds requested. In addition, these data reveal project-specific information generated during the evaluation process, including external reviewer scores, stage of advancement through the competition, and how much funding was recommended and dispersed, if any.
To identify "entrepreneurial-firm" applicants, we first restricted attention to proposals from for-profit companies, thus omitting awards to universities and non-profits. Based on a state business registry (described below), we then identified the founding years of for-profit applicants and selected the subset that were 15 years or younger as of the application year. 11 This age filter eliminated 23 older firms from the estimation sample, but retained 92 percent of all for-profit applicants. As a robustness check, we re-ran the regressions below with the entire company-applicant sample and obtained similar results.
Finally, thirteen (13) firms filed multiple applications in a given round of competition. If a firm with multiple applications received R&D funds in a single round, we omitted unfunded proposals of the company from the control-group sample. For non-winners with multiple submissions, we retained only the applicant's top-ranked proposal in the control group to yield greater comparability with the awardee sample.
In combination, these criteria resulted in 273 applications filed by 233 entrepreneurial firms from 2002 through 2008.
Startup Characteristics and Outcome Variables
Empirical studies on entrepreneurial firms face notorious data-collection challenges. Unlike older and publicly traded companies, information about entrepreneurial firms is more scattered and difficult to obtain. In light of this challenge, we integrate data from multiple sources. Key sources include the MEDC archives (for applicant-level information and reviewer scores), the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs database (for commercial viability), VenturXpert (for follow-on VC financing), SBIR awardee lists (for SBIR awards), Delphion (for successful applications of U.S. patents). We supplement these data with searches of company websites, press releases, and news articles as needed.
Information from these sources is used to compile three time-varying indicators of new venture performance: (1) whether the firm remains in business (i.e., "survives") by time t; (2) its ability to secure financing from other third parties; and (3) its productivity in generating patents.
Unfortunately, we lack reliable firm-level data on annual R&D expenditures and employment growth.
Our first outcome variable, Survival, is based on the "current status" of companies listed in the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) database. Five main status types are listed: (1) active; (2) active but not in good standing; (3) dissolved; (4) withdrawn; and (5) merged. Fortunately, the database also indicates the date on which a firm switches type (if at all). For firms listed in categories other than "active," we conducted supplemental searches of company websites and press release. This process helps ensure that a "dissolved" or "withdrawn" status does not simply reflect movement from the state or a re-organization via merger or acquisition. In ambiguous cases, we called the company to determine whether it was still in business. The LARA database also reports incorporation dates for Michigan-based companies, which we used to determine the ages of applicant-firms in our sample.
A second outcome variable pertains to follow-on financing, and is used to test the "certification" hypothesis (Lerner 1999; Wallsten 2000) -that winning a competitive R&D award casts a positive signal to other investors, thus making it easier to attract other sources of financing.
Young science and technology companies seek financial capital from numerous sources. Prominent among those capital sources are grants from the SBIR and investments from VCs. To identify SBIR awards to applicant-companies, we searched the Small Business Administration (SBA) TECH-Net database by company names, using company locations to ensure a match. We then compiled the number of SBA awards to each applicant company, including both Phrase I and Phrase II awards.
For VC investments, we conducted similar searches of VentureXpert, a venture capital database commonly used in empirical research (e.g., Lenox 2005, Park and Steensma 2012) , company websites, and Zephyr, which includes news articles about VC deals since 1997. Since funding amounts were sparsely reported, our proxy for follow-on VC financing is based on the number of VC investment rounds (if any) listed for each firm.
A third outcome variable, Patent Productivity, captures whether state R&D funding enhances the innovative productivity of participating firms. Although an imperfect measure of innovative output, patent counts capture the extent to which these startups succeed in producing novel and patent-worthy inventions from their R&D activities. By searching company names in the Delphion database, we assemble all U.S. patents awarded to these companies through 2010. The annual patent productivity of each company is based on the dates that issued patents are filed rather than granted, as is conventional practice in the literature. 
Estimation Method
Establishing a causal relationship between state R&D financing and the subsequent performance of new ventures poses well-known methodological challenges (David et al. 2000; Klette et al. 2000) . In light of that challenge, we employ multiple empirical approaches and estimation samples. First, we estimate "naïve regressions" that use the entire applicant-pool sample but control for observable characteristics of the firms pre-treatment. Second, we restrict attention to more comparable applicants that proceed to the second round of the competition and use external reviewer scores to further control for unobservable characteristics of firms insufficiently captured by covariates in our regressions. In a final set of analyses, we use regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods to estimate effects with subsets of firms proximate to the cut-off in scores that determine the allocation of funding. Intuitively, we assume that omitted variable problems fall as more restrictions are imposed upon the sample. The trade-off, of course, is that the corresponding decline in sample sizes could reduce estimation precision. We therefore report results using multiple methods and samples and assess patterns among them.
Controlling for Observables
Equation (1) represents our baseline model:
+1 is the outcome variable of applicant i in subsequent period t+1. is a binary variable that indicates whether the company was funded (1=funded; else=0). is a vector of applicant-level covariates that include the age of the firm in the competition year, the industrial sector, the application category (applied research vs. commercialization project), and competition-year fixed effects. Controlling for these observable firm-level characteristics, we estimate effects with the entire pool of entrepreneurial-firm applicants, including firms that sought but failed to receive an award.
When the dependent variable is a binary variable such as an indicator of survival, where +1 = ( +1 = 1| ) and is the binary indicator, we use probit estimation with robust standard errors. Marginal effects are reported for ease of interpretation. When the dependent variable is a count (i.e., number of SBA awards, patents, or VC investments), we use a Poisson quasimaximum likelihood estimator, again with robust standard errors. As Gourieroux et al. (1984) and Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) report, Poisson QMLE outperforms OLS in terms of fit and robustness when dependent variables are non-negative and skewed.
Using scores as proxies for unobservable firm-level characteristics
Refining the "naïve" (control for observables-only) regressions, we restrict attention to more comparable Round 2 applicants and use the scores assigned by external reviewers to control for unobservable firm-level characteristics omitted from equation (1) that may otherwise affect applicant performance. More specifically, we select Round 2-only firms and define cutoff as the score above which companies are recommended for funding. We then subtract the cutoff from the second-round score of company i in application category j in year t, defined as . This process yields a normalized score for each applicant, defined as = -. To make the variable more flexible in a parametric estimation, we add a smooth quadratic function of the normalized score to equation (1) and estimate the following equation:
Estimation near the discontinuity border
Our final approach exploits the discontinuous breakpoint between external reviewer scores and funding probabilities more fully by invoking regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods widely used in labor and education economics (Lee & Lemieux 2010) . Black et al. (2007) , for example, use discontinuities in treatment status to evaluate the effects of government training services on individuals in search of re-employment. Implementing RDD in an instrumental variable framework, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) test the causal effects of educational remedial programs on the scholastic achievement of students. A separate body of research, more closely related to this study, uses RDD methods to discern how government R&D grants affect the career trajectories and productivity of individual scientists (Carter et al. 1987 , Arora and Gambardella 2005 , Chudnovsky et al. 2008 , Ubfal and Maffioli, 2011 .
Intuitively, RDD methods compare the performance of companies that lie slightly above a discontinuity border with that of entities falling slightly below that border. In doing so, scholars assume that companies within certain bandwidths of the cut-off border are more similar to one another than they are to firms located at more distant points in the distribution (Lee & Lemieux 2010) . Similarly, we assume that two companies with normalized scores of +50 and -50 (i.e., positive and negative outliers) are less comparable than two companies with normalized scores of +1 and -1, where both firms have scores close to the funding breakpoint.
To infer causality using RDD methods in this setting, three assumptions must be met: (1) the cut-off score cannot be pre-determined and subject to manipulation by applicants; (2) the relationship between the score and the probability of funding must be non-linear (i.e., a breakpoint must exist); (3) applicant characteristics (both observed and unobserved) must be comparable in the cutoff region (Lee & Lemieux 2010) .
As discussed earlier, an independent panel of external reviewers scores each funding
proposal. The cut-off score is unknown to applicants in advance and can change across competitions: it is largely driven by the total funds allocated to a competition in advance of solicitations for proposals and the amount of funds requested by high-ranked submissions.
Therefore, assumption (1) is satisfied. Figure 3a and 3b suggest that assumption (2) is satisfied: the probability of receiving state R&D funding shifts discontinuously with external reviewer scores. Figure 3a is a lowess smoother with bandwidth 0.8. Figure 3b plots the mean of the binary variable "funded" over constant 10-unit intervals. Both figures reveal a visible and discontinuous pattern. Table 2 evaluates the comparability of firms just below and above the discontinuity border based on observable characteristics. Panel A of Table 2 reports mean values of applicant characteristics within 20-points of the discontinuous cutoff. Panel B reports similar statistics for the narrower 15-point bandwidth. Based on two-tailed t tests, the average pre-treatment characteristics of the groups are statistically indistinguishable in both panels. Despite the evidence in Table 2 , it is possible of course that firms near the funding cutoff differ in unobserved ways likely to affect future performance. Lacking a direct test, we must assume that this latter requirement-of comparability in unobserved traits-is met (Lee & Lemieux 2010) .
Findings
To Table 3 reports regression estimates of equations (1) and (2) with two time-periods of survival and the four applicant-firm samples discussed above. The dependent variable in Panel A and B is a binary indicator of whether an applicant is active (i.e., not in poor standing or disbanded) 2 and 3 years after the competition respectively. All regressions include year, industry sector and project category dummies as control variables. For the Round 2 sample (Cols. 2 and 6), normalized applicant scores also are included to control for omitted firm-specific characteristics.
Effects on firm survival
The results in Table 3 are quite striking. Regardless of the survival period or estimation sample, applicants that receive state R&D financing are significantly more likely to survive than those that do not. Importantly, we find no evidence that this result is a simple artifact of the selection process. Even after the sample is narrowed to more comparable sets of firms (Round 2-only, and those proximate to the funding cutoff), Table 3 suggests that awardees are 18% to 26% more likely to survive 2-3 years following the competition than firms seeking but failing to receive such awards. The results are robust to the exclusion of 27 applicants with merger/acquisition exits, and to use of a 4-year survival period that implicitly drops the 2008 cohort.
We interpret this evidence as consistent with the view that state R&D financing relaxed the financial constraints for these companies: absent R&D funds from the state, otherwise-comparable companies were less likely to remain in business.
Effects on follow-on financing
A second set of analyses tests the "certification hypothesis" that, by certifying new venture quality, state R&D awards reduce informational problems in markets for entrepreneurial capital and thereby stimulate the subsequent financing activities of young companies (Lerner 1999, Feldman and Kenney 2003) . Table 4 reports the estimated effect of state R&D awards on follow-on financing from SBA and VC sources. Tables 5 and 6 test for heterogeneous effects within the sample: If state R&D awards certify quality to external capital providers, their effects should be more pronounced for startups with greater informational challenges in such markets.
Turning first to Columns (1) and (9) of Table 4 and the full entrepreneurial-applicant sample, the estimates suggest that funded startups receive significantly more SBA awards and VC investments in the two years following the competition. Columns (5) and (13) of Table 4 reveal, however, that the Funded coefficient is no longer significant at conventional levels in the longer 4-year post-competition-year window. Although suggestive of a short-term certification effect, this result could be due to the process used to select applicants for funding. As noted earlier, the ability to secure third-party financial commitments is among the criteria used in the selection process.
To disentangle certification from a potential "cherry-picking" effect, Table 4 restricts the sample to more comparable subsets of Round 2-only firms (in Cols. 2, 6, 10, and 14) and those near the discontinuity border in the remaining columns. Once the estimation sample is restricted to more comparable firms, we fail to discern a significant effect of the awards on follow-on financing activities from either government/SBA (Panel A) or private/VC (Panel B) sources. We therefore interpret the evidence in Table 4 as more consistent with the "cherry-picking" of firms with greater financing prospects for the awards than a causal relationship between award receipt and follow-on financing for the average company.
If state R&D awards reduce informational problems in entrepreneurial capital markets (via certification), however, we should expect heterogeneous treatment effects within the sample. More specifically, the awards should "matter more" to new ventures facing wider the information gaps with potential capital providers.
To test the certification hypothesis more fully, we therefore identify three sources of firmlevel variation likely to correlate with information asymmetry levels within the context of our study.
Absent R&D financing from the state, startups with prior VC-backing or SBA awards should be better able than their unfunded counterparts to convey quality to external capital providers. If state R&D awards serve a quality-certification function, we therefore should expect their effects on follow-on financing to be more pronounced among startups lacking prior VC-backing or SBA awards. Similarly, the awards should be especially important for younger (versus older) startups given the relative lack of observable track records with which to convey performance-potential.
On a related point, Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and others suggest that (a) "hubs" of entrepreneurial activity house rich information about entrepreneurs and the resources for building new companies flows and that (b) such information transfers imperfectly across geographic distances. If true, we should expect less efficient ("thinner") entrepreneurial capital markets farther away from hubs of entrepreneurial activity, therefore amplifying the certification value of R&D awards from the state. For simplicity, we show results only for the 2-year period following the competition (t+2) and list them separately for SBA awards (in Table 5 ) and follow-on rounds of VC investment (in Table 6 ).
As before, we use four estimation samples: (a) all entrepreneurial-applicants (i.e., the "full sample"), (b) Round-2 only firms (using reviewer scores to proxy for unobserved firm characteristics), (c) firms 20 or fewer points surrounding the normalized funding cutoff, and (d) firms 15 or fewer normalized points surrounding the funding breakpoint. Naturally, the sample-size shrinks as more restrictions are added.
To synthesize key findings from Tables 5 and 6, Table 7 reports the estimated conditional effect of state R&D awards on follow-on financing for our most comparable subsample of firmsthose closest to the funding threshold (i.e., the "15 bandwidth" companies). Standard errors and confidence intervals are computed with formulas reported in Hilbe (2008) , given the non-linearity of the estimator.
Turning first to Panel A of Table 7 , the estimates suggest that receipt of state R&D financing significantly boosts the predicted levels of follow-on financing for entrepreneurial firms lacking prior VC-backing or SBA awards: among this subset of relatively disadvantaged companies, awardees received 11.8 times (=exp(2.47)) more follow-on SBA awards and 4.46 times (=exp(1.49)) more rounds of VC financing relative to otherwise comparable applicants that sought but failed to receive an award. As depicted in Figure 4a , we fail to discern a significant effect of state R&D awards on the follow-on financing of applicants with prior VC or SBA funding, suggesting that the marginal effect of being "certified" by the state is negligible for such companies.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we expected to find that the conditional effect of state R&D awards would grow larger as distance from the VC hub increases. The evidence is only partially supportive of this view. Similar to the findings in Panel A, Panel B suggests that the "certification" value of state R&D awards is negligible for startups located in better-developed markets for entrepreneurial capital (i.e., inside a hub of VC activity). For those located outside the VC hub, however, the conditional effect of state R&D award on follow-on financing is statistically significant and increasing in distance-but only for other government (SBA) sources. More specifically, the point estimates in Panel B of Table 7 suggest that effect of state R&D financing on the securement of future SBA awards is roughly 5 times (=exp(2.85)/exp(1.21)) larger for firms located 100 miles from the VC hub than it is for firms located only 50 miles from the hub. Although the magnitude of the effect also is increasing in distance for follow-on VC financing (reported in the second column of Table 7 , Panel B), the estimated effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Figure 4b plots these effects.
Panel C of Table 7 similarly reveals partial evidence that state R&D awards "matter more" to the follow-on financing activities of younger companies. Here, however, the effect is statistically significant for private/VC but not for government/SBA sources. As shown in Figure 4c , state R&D award significantly boost the number of VC financing otherwise predicted for young firms. The magnitude of the effect decreases with age, however, and becomes insignificant when the firm is more than 2 years old.
Although the evidence in Tables 5-7 suggests that the effects of state R&D awards on follow-on financing can differ markedly for government/SBA and private/VC sources, it is generally consistent with the view that the "certification value" of the awards is higher in the presence of greater informational imperfections in external markets for entrepreneurial capital.
Effects on patent productivity
A final set of analyses in Tables 8 investigates the effects of state R&D funding on patent productivity. Aided by funds from the state, startups should be able to proceed with R&D and commercialization activities more aggressively than otherwise possible. If true, receipt of stategovernment financing should enable awardees to yield more innovative output from their endeavors.
To investigate this potential productivity effects, we test whether receipt of state-government financing increases the annual production of patented inventions by new ventures. In Columns (1) and (5) of Table 8 , the Funded coefficient is positive predictor of patent productivity but the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This result is especially surprising since it is based on the entire applicant pool. As noted earlier, the criteria used to score proposals include scientific merit. Assuming that such merit correlates with patenting potential, we should expect a positive and significant Funded coefficient simply as an artifact of the selection process. We fail, however, to discern this effect. The effect is not driven by differential survival rates of funded and unfunded companies. As a robustness check, we retained failed companies in the sample (with post-exit patenting output coded as zero) and obtained similar results. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Funded remains statistically insignificant in other columns of Table 8 , where the estimation sample comprises more comparable firms.
One explanation for this "non-finding" is measurement error. Small firms often submit provisional filings a year in advance of formal patent applications, which could make it more difficult to discern a near-term effect. As a robustness check, we re-estimated effects using the earliest date associated with each patented invention (including the date of a provisional filings if any). The results were qualitatively unchanged.
Similarly, it is logical to assume that many applicant-firms are commercializing technologies from Michigan-based universities. Since universities typically retain title to inventions originating from their labs, this could impose a downward bias on our patent-based output measures. To investigate this possibility, we used supplemental information from press releases and news articles to identify applicants (~36% of the full sample) founded by university faculty or formed to commercialize university inventions. In supplemental analyses, we find no evidence that this source of measurement error explains the patent-related non-finding.
A final, more plausible explanation is that the funds allocated by the state are used primarily to accelerate time-to-market rather than to discover and develop new products. In this event, patentbased estimates could underestimate the true productivity effects associated with the awards.
Unfortunately, we lack reliable time-to-market indicators with which to investigate this issue further.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study investigates whether R&D financing from state-government sources improves the performance of technology startups. Using novel data on Michigan-based programs, we test for causal linkages between state R&D financing and new venture performance with multiple outcome variables and methods, including regression discontinuity design. Increasingly common within the field of economics (e.g., Black 1999, Lee and Lemieux 2010) , RDD methods remain under-utilized in the strategic management and entrepreneurial finance literatures.
We present new and compelling evidence that these state-run R&D awards increased the commercial viability (i.e., survival) of award recipients relative to startups that sought but failed to receive such awards. We find little evidence that this survival effect is driven solely by the selection of "better" companies into awards. Proximate to the funding threshold, recipients and nonrecipients are comparable based on observable pre-treatment characteristics. Nonetheless, state funding remains a positive and significant predictor of survival among these otherwise-comparable applicants. This evidence is consistent with the view that public R&D financing helps ameliorate imperfections in capital markets for entrepreneurial companies: absent R&D financing from the state, our findings suggest that otherwise comparable ventures were less likely to remain in business.
The effects of state R&D awards on other salient outcomes for technology ventures-the production of patents and the securement of other third-party financing-are more ambiguous in the context of this study. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that state funds bolstered the patent productivity of recipient companies, an effect that could reflect the more applied and commercialization-focused orientation of the program.
We do, however, find more nuanced effects on follow-on financing. In regressions that include all applicants in the estimation sample, receipt of state R&D financing correlates with greater follow-on financing activity in the two-year period following the award, from both public (SBIR) and private (venture capital) sources. At first blush, this finding appears to confirm the "certification effect" shown in empirical studies of federal R&D programs (Lerner 1999, Feldman and Kelley 2003) : winning public R&D competitions can cast a positive signal that helps attract additional sources of financing. We show, however that the overall effect dissipates in more comparable pretreatment samples. This finding underscores the importance of taking into account potential "cherry picking" in the provision of entrepreneurial capital, a topic widely discussed in the program evaluation literature (Klette et al. 2000 , Wallsten 2000 : firms likely to attract other sources of financing typically receive higher scores and are more likely to receive funding.
More consistent with the view that state R&D awards help certify the value of young companies to other capital providers, we observe heterogeneous treatment effects within the sample.
In general, we find that state R&D awards "matter more" to the follow-on financing activities of firms that lack prior VC funding or SBA awards, are younger, and are located farther away from spatial hubs of entrepreneurial activities. Assuming that these firm-level traits correlate with greater inefficiencies in securing access to financial resources, this evidence is consistent with the view that public R&D financing can help ameliorate imperfections that arise in markets for entrepreneurial financing.
This study is limited in ways that build a natural the stage for further research. Of particular note, our analysis is based on R&D awards from a single state in the decade of the 2000s, when technology ventures faced tighter capital constraints than was true in the boom years of the late1990s. From a policy perspective, this timing of the Michigan-based programs was fortuitous: it increased the odds of capital-market imperfections that public monies could help address (Lerner 2009 ). If similar data were compiled for more longstanding government programs, future studies could investigate how the magnitude of private-sector outcomes associated with public R&D financing are altered by macroeconomic conditions. (6), (10), (14) with Round 2 sample also include score (squared) and score terms as control variables Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: 1. Year, industry, and application category dummies are included in all regressions 2. Regressions (2) and (6) with round 2 sample also include score (squared) and score terms as control variables
